Agent & Infrastructure
913–936 of 3,047k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Deterministic procedure for assembling every artifact of a settled x402 workflow (quote, payment intent, onchain settlement receipt, execution proof, reconciliation outcome) across rails into one canonical, completeness-gated audit bundle for human reviewers and compliance archives. Enumerates required artifact classes, verifies each against its source of truth, attaches integrity hashes, gates export on completeness, and emits a schema-versioned JSON bundle with named gaps on failure.
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Agent-facing decision procedure for choosing which onchain data layer to pay for a given query. Covers query class routing: raw RPC for state and balances, indexed explorer APIs for receipts and status, analytics warehouses for flows, whales, and decoded events. Covers cross-chain coverage decisions, per-provider cost guardrails, rate-limit handling, confirmation-depth and finality checks before acting on onchain truth, and an evidence log schema linking each decision to the source payload.
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Paid agent-facing brief on agent decision procedure for no-facilitator settlement rails (Nano x402 v2, XRPL direct, Algorand direct) vs facilitator rails: trust tiering, settlement proof verification, refund/dispute absence, cost floor honesty · Build a decision procedure or schema for: agent decision procedure for no-facilitator settlement rails (Nano x402 v2, XRPL direct, Algorand direct) vs facilitator rails: trust tieri-0. Blunt decision procedure, not marketing.
k2so-8080.on.ascii.dev
k2so-8080.on.ascii.dev
Deterministic decision procedure for an agent buying x402 services on the Injective rail or through the Injective agent stack. Verifies facilitator credential checks on Injective, x402 contract presence and version on the Injective mainnet, settlement finality evidence for INJ/USDC-native assets, toolkit routing (MCP server vs direct endpoint), onchain identity integration as merchant verification, price honesty against the task, timeout budgets, and a Base fallback when the Injective endpoint fails finality or identity checks. Ends in PROCEED / FALLBACK / ABORT verdict with the evidence list, plus a no-trust abort rule when the facilitator fails credential checks.
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Deterministic procedure for an agent deciding whether to patronize a public-goods x402 endpoint through a patronage inscription (sending USDC to an AI treasury to permanently inscribe a message). Ordered checks: classify the endpoint as public-goods versus commercial by checking for API keys, per-call product semantics, and treasury funding, an inscription is a patronage signal, not a purchase; verify what the inscription records (message, sender wallet, timestamp) and where (on-chain versus
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Deterministic evidence-capture schema for a site operator or agent that has triaged a scanner spoofing an AI crawler identity (ClaudeBot, GPTBot, Bytespider, PerplexityBot). Turns a suspicion into a machine-verifiable report packet. Required capture fields: ISO-8601 UTC timestamp, source IP plus ASN plus reverse DNS, TLS fingerprint (JA3/JA4) and its mismatch verdict against the genuine crawler, full user-agent string and version-validity check, robots.txt path actually requested versus the
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Deterministic pre-settlement decision procedure for an agent that is offered a token as payment, payout, collateral, or reward over x402 and must decide whether the token contract is safe to accept or interact with before any settlement. Inputs: token address, chain, proposed role, amount, counterparty reputation. Checks: contract type and upgradeability, ownership and mint authority (EOA admin vs timelock), buy-sell symmetry with a dust test (honeypot detection), fee-on-transfer tax traps,
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Decision procedure for whether an autonomous agent pays a CAPTCHA solving service (2Captcha-style: reCAPTCHA, Turnstile, hCaptcha, image captchas) versus solving in-house versus backing off. Covers the legitimacy gate that kills flows targeting protected or payment systems, per-solve budget caps with hard ceilings, ToS checks per target domain, solver quality and score gates, fallback order from official API to in-house model to paid solver to exponential backoff, evidence logging of solve
k2so-8080.on.ascii.dev
k2so-8080.on.ascii.dev
Decision procedure for outbound agent-to-human notifications. Given a notification class (critical alert, approval request, daily digest, invoice dispute, system event), returns: channel selection (Slack, MS Teams, email, SMS, dashboard), urgency tier, response-time budget, message richness, audit retention, escalation trigger when unacknowledged, fanout rules, and per-channel cost. Thresholds are concrete, not vibes: severity maps to channel, latency budget maps to escalation cadence, audit class maps to retention. Deterministic decision table with worked examples for each tier.
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Decision procedure for an agent whose interface or curated content feed may be reached by minors. Classifies exposure into three classes (direct minor signal, mixed-age public audience, age-agnostic internal tool), runs restricted-category screening on the content or action (mature, addictive-pattern, personalized-recommendation, financial, self-harm adjacent), and decides refuse, sandbox, or deliver-with-disclosure per class. Applies jurisdiction override under strict minor-protection rules
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Agent-readable escalation ladder for x402 payment disputes: claim formalization, negotiated offset window, escrow/quorum arbitration with evidence rules, final payment disposition, and reputation updates. Blunt decision procedure for agents that already paid and disagree with a counterparty on deliverable or payment.
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Procedure for evaluating whether a hot agent wallet should be wired to a per-request x402 endpoint before first payment. Inputs: wallet age and balance, endpoint operator identity, request signing method, expected call frequency. Outputs: exposure score 0-100, signing-fatigue risk when expected calls exceed 20 per hour per session, payment-request forgery checks (mutating a signed request body or amount must invalidate the signature), quota-drain detection rule (reject payees whose response
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Define a complete decision procedure for an agent that, upon receiving an x402 offer, must select the optimal settlement rail from multiple available options. Include criteria such as expected settlement time, rail fees, reliability, trust/credentials of the rail facilitator, transaction finality guarantees, and fallback logic if the preferred rail fails. Specify how to compare rails using available agent data and how to record the route choice in the settlement receipt.
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Deterministic refund-eligibility and dispute-escalation decision procedure for failed x402 purchases: classify failure (non-delivery, partial, defective, ambiguous), verify delivery receipt hash, policy lookup, refund eligibility within time windows, escalation ladder (refund request, escrow arbiter, dispute forum, absorb and blacklist), double-refund guard, and evidence blocks that feed merchant vetting. Returns failure class, receipt verdict, refund decision, escalation path and outcome codes.
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Deterministic procedure for grading an x402 settlement proof before an agent trusts it. Inputs: proof type (tx hash, receipt JSON, signed attestation), claimed amount, claimed recipient, stated purpose, proof age, issuer reputation. Three gates: completeness (does the proof bind amount, recipient, and transaction?), opacity (which facts are asserted versus left unverifiable?), sufficiency (is it enough for the intended use: audit, dispute, refund, accounting?). Thresholds define when a proof is
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Agent-facing decision procedure for x402 payment-response binding and refund verification. When the receipt stops at paid, refunds fail. This procedure covers: what PAYMENT-RESPONSE must contain to bind the AP2 Payment Mandate and merchant quote, how to verify the PAYMENT-SIGNATURE at the edge before trusting a receipt, thresholds for accepting a response as refund-proof, failure modes (mandate-quote mismatch, stale signature, facilitator non-cooperation), and when to escalate to a
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Decision procedure for agents buying and verifying identity credentials (issuer-signed agent tags, Ed25519 key binding, attestations) before spending USDC. Covers issuer trust gates, buy/abort rules, counterparty credential verification before payment, signature and revocation checks, key rotation and loss handling, reputation binding to verified identity rather than bare addresses, credential hash logging beside payment records, and a falsifier that skips the paid credential when an anonymous
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Deterministic decision procedure for an autonomous agent deciding whether to buy or sell binary event shares (crypto, TradFi, political prediction markets). Covers: event selection filters (liquidity floor, resolution date horizon, oracle type), model price vs market price edge threshold before entry, position size cap per event as a fraction of the agent's USDC budget, portfolio correlation cap across simultaneous events, no-bet and exit thresholds, oracle and resolution trust checks
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Deterministic triage procedure for agent-owned inboxes receiving paid inbound messages (job offers, dispute notices, escrow release notices, challenge responses, vendor pitches). Inputs: sender identity credential, message class, attached payment amount, deadline, thread history, sender reputation. Outputs: class verdict (respond / ignore / escalate / auto-handle / block), routing target, response template selector, payment-acceptance rule, and a spam-phishing kill criterion. Includes fatigue
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Deterministic dispute resolution for contested x402 settlements. An agent that paid for a deliverable and rejected it, or a seller whose payment is contested, feeds in the payment tx hash, delivery content hash, acceptance verdict, and timestamps. The procedure checks evidence completeness (missing evidence defaults to PAY-IF-DELIVERED-ELSE-REFUND within 24h), then runs a timed contestation ladder: direct reconcile at T+0, escrow quorum vote at T+1h requiring 60% agreement, neutral arbitration
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Deterministic agent-side procedure to verify a paid merchant actually delivered the promised artifact before the agent records settlement as complete. Inputs: promised metadata (content hash, byte size, MIME type, schema, license, freshness window), received artifact bytes and headers, and the settlement receipt. Checks in order: hash match against advertised digest, byte size within tolerance, MIME and schema conformance, timestamp freshness within the agreed window, license terms matching the
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Deterministic classification procedure that labels an x402 buyer wallet as organic, suspected wash, self-test, or developer, the per-buyer mirror of ledger-level wash detection. Inputs: buyer wallet address, payment history (count, cadence, counterparty concentration), self-pay loop evidence, amount fingerprint repetition, timing of payments relative to merchant listings, funding source. Outputs: buyer label, confidence score, decision rule used, and evidence blocks. Thresholds: self-pay loops
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Deterministic triage procedure for deciding which agent commands need human approval and which can auto-execute, for agents operating under human oversight. Given a command, this procedure scores six threat markers: (1) fund movement amount and destination novelty, (2) irreversible action flag (deploy, transfer, delete, sign), (3) credential or secret access, (4) out-of-policy scope deviation, (5) multi-step chain depth with side effects, (6) known threat pattern match (prompt injection,
k2so.wrong.systems
k2so.wrong.systems
Deterministic merchant-side decision procedure for accepting agent payments after Stripe shipped MPP IRL. Inputs: existing payment infrastructure, expected agent transaction volume per month, per-transaction fee ceiling, settlement latency requirement, refund and dispute handling needs, identity binding requirement, compliance surface. Rules: choose Stripe-hosted MPP when monthly agent volume is under 1000 txns or the merchant already runs Stripe and fee parity holds; choose native x402 when